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Aircraft Hijacking: Some Domestic
and International Responses
By JoHN A. VoLPE* and JoHN T. STEwART, Jn. * *
Air piracy is one of the gravest problems of our time. From
the domestic reactions to the first symptoms of the malady-the
detours to Havana in the early 1960's-to the strengthened do-
mestic and international response to the epidemic at the turn of
the decade, Secretary Volpe and Mr. Stewart here catalogue a
definitive statement of what has been done and what yet must
be done to combat air piracy and international blackmail: the
legal and scientific devices employed by the U.S. and urged for
other countries, and international cooperation such as in the
Tokyo Convention, the Hague Conventiont of December, 1970,
and the draft conventions remaining on the international agenda.
On May 1, 1961, an armed Cuban exile named Elphi Crosisi,
who reportedly considered himself to be the reincarnation of a
Spanish Main pirate by the name of Cofrisi, entered the cockpit
of a United States National Airlines aircraft on a flight from
Marathon to Key West, Florida, and forced the pilot to fly to
Cuba.' Thus began what was to become a decade of concern, both
domestically for the United States and eventually for the entire
world, with the phenomenon of "aircraft hijacking" or, as it was
more dramatically called in the earlier years of the decade,
§ Secretary of Transportation. Former three-time Governor of Massachusetts.
*0 Chief, International and Airports Branch, General Counsel's Office, Federal
Aviation Administration, Department of Transportation. A.B. Yale, 1949; LL.B.
Columbia, 1955. Member of U.S. Delegations to the Meetings of the 17th and
18th Sessions of the ICAO Legal Committee, the 17th ICAO Assembly (Extra-
ordinary Session) and the Diplomatic Conference on Air Law convented at The
Hague in December, 1970.
AuTaons' Nom. The authors wish to express their appreciation to Messrs. Oscar
Shienbrood and Paul Galis of the FAA General Counsels Office for their able
assistance in the preparation of this article.
t The Hague Convention of December, 1970, appears as Appendix A to this
article.
1 N.Y. Times, May 2, 1961, at 1, col. 6.
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"aircraft piracy." During that decade there have been over 200
attempts of aircraft hijacking.2
The hazards to aviation safety posed by this activity were
summarized by the Acting Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration [hereinafter FAA] in testimony before the House
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee. He pointed out
that-
[H]ijacking has involved physical danger to the passengers
and the crew. Passengers have been held as hostages or in-
timidated and crewmembers have been subjected to minor
assaults. It is obvious that should a bomb or other form of
explosive discharge aboard an aircraft that the aircraft could
be lost. Gunplay aboard could involve injury or death among
the crew or passengers. As to the possible effects of bullets
penetrating the aircraft fuselage, there is little danger of cat-
astrophic effects regarding cabin pressurization; however,
there is danger that critical aircraft parts could be hit and
rendered inoperable (hydraulic or electrical systems, radios,
or fuel tanks).
There is always the danger that the hijacker could insist
on diverting the flight to a destination beyond the range of
the aircraft's fuel supply. This could result in a ditching, a
crash landing, or an emergency landing at an airport without
the required runway length for the aircraft involved. The
aircraft could be diverted to an airport at which bad weather
and a lack of navigational aids would make an approach and
landing unsafe. The hijacker could divert the aircraft to an
unfriendly or hostile country where the passengers would be
subject to imprisonment.
The action of the hijacker in exploding a bomb or firing a
gun or the general commotion caused by the seizure could
cause a fire on board the aircraft with resulting injuries,
death, or accident.
The act of seizing the aircraft by the hijacker might cause
certain passengers to react in an imprudent manner resulting
in injuries to themselves or other passengers on the aircraft.3
2 According to statistics maintained by the Federal Aviation Administration's
Ofce of Air Transportation Security. For the period May 1, 1961 through
December 29, 1970, there had been 100 hijacking attempts involving U.S. aircraft
-77 successful and 23 unsuccessful. 19 different U.S. carriers have been involved
and hijackers have boarded air carriers in 44 different cities.3 HousE Colm. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN CommERcE, PRELmIAnY RIEP.,
A r r PIRACY, H.R. REi. No. 91-33, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1969).
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Recognizing these dangers, what then has been done to
combat the problem? The United States Government and the
world community have responded to the highly dangerous activity
in a variety of ways. The objectives have been deterrence, pre-
vention, and the assurance of punishment.
Tim U.S. RESPONSE-AN EAY REACTION
The Crosisi incident was followed in July, 1961 by the hijack-
ing to Cuba of an Eastern Airlines' flight from Miami.4 The
dramatic nature of these incidents catalyzed the United States
Government into action. The reaction to these "first" series of
hijackings occurring in 1961 was immediate and was designed to
create a legal framework within which the United States could
deal with the problem. On July 28, 1961, four days after the
hijacking of the Eastern flight, the FAA issued a Special Civil
Air Regulation (SR-448) which prohibited interference with
flight crewmembers in the performance of their duties and the
carrying of concealed firearms by unauthorized persons aboard
airline aircraft.5 The preamble to Special Civil Air Regulation No.
SR-448A stated:
The recent hijackings of air carrier aircraft have high-
lighted a necessity to provide additional controls over the con-
duct of passengers in order to avoid a serious threat to the
safety of flights and persons aboard them. The Federal
Aviation Agency has the responsibility to see that air carriers
take such steps as are possible to prevent such occurrences.
We have requested the air carriers to take every practicable
precaution to prevent passengers from having access to the
pilot compartment. In addition, we are adopting a regu-
4 N.Y. Times, July 25, 1961, at 1, col. 7.
U.S.C. § 1472(j). Similarly, the unauthorized carrying, or attempting to carry, a
concealed deadly or dangerous weapon on board an air carrier aircraft has also
been made a federal crime. See 49 U.S.C. § 1472(1). Present Federal Aviation
Regulations, 14 C.F.R. § 121.585 (1970 Supp.), provide:
No person may, while aboard an airplane being operated by an air
carrier in air transportation, carry on or about his person a deadly or
dangerous weapon, either concealed or unconcealed. This paragraph does
not a pply to-
(a) Orcials or employees of a municipality or a State, or of the
United States, who are authorized to carry arms; and
(b) Crewmembers and other persons authorized by the air carrier
to carry arms.
1970]
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lation which will prohibit any person, except one who is
specifically authorized to carry arms, from carrying on or
about his person while aboard an air carrier aircraft a con-
cealed deadly or dangerous weapon. The regulation being
adopted will also make it a violation of the CARs [Civil Air
Regulations] for any person to assault, threaten, intimidate,
or interfere with a crewmember in the performance of his or
her duties aboard an air carrier aircraft or to attempt to or
cause a flight crewmember to divert the flight from its in-
tended course or destination.
Violation of this regulation carried with it a maximum civil
penalty of $1,000 for each offense.(
On August 3, 1961, a third hijacking took place. An ex-convict,
Leon Beardon, and his 14-year old son Cody, hijacked a Con-
tinental Airlines flight from Los Angeles to Houston.7 Primarily
as a result of this and the two previous hijackings, Congress
passed Public Law No. 87-197 which was signed by President
Kennedy on September 5, 1961. This law amended the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958 and prescribed severe Federal penalties for
the commission of certain crimes, including aircraft piracy, aboard
aircraft.9 "Aircraft piracy" is defined in the statute as meaning
"any seizure or exercise of control, by force or violence or threat
of force or violence and with wrongful intent, of an aircraft in
flight in air commerce."10 The choice of the term "air piracy"
is best explained by the following excerpt from the Report of
the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce which ac-
companied H.R. 8384, the House bill to amend the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958:
649 U.S.C. § 1471(a) (1).
7N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1961, at 1, col. 2.8 Act of Sept. 5, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-197, 75 Stat. 466.
949 U.S.C. § 1472(i) (1964) (air piracy); 49 U.S.C. § 1472(j) (1964);
(interference with flight crew); 49 U.S.C. § 1472 (k) (1) (1964); (offenses subject
to Federal jurisdiction if committed within the special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the U.S. These include assault, maiming, larceny, receiving stolen
property, murder manslaughter, attempt to commit murder or manslaughter,
rape, carnal knowfedge and robbery; 49 U.S.C. § 1472(k) (2) (1964). Certain acts
which if committed in the District of Columbia would be a violation of the Act
entitled "An Act for the preservation of public peace and protection of property
within the District of Columbia" (D.C. Code sec. 22-1112); 49 U.S.C. § 472 (1)
(1964) (the unauthorized carriage of a concealed weapon); 49 U.S.C. § 1472(m)
(1964) (imparting false information).
10 49 U.S.C. § 1472(i) (2).
[Vol. 59
AIRcRAFr HIjACKING
The term "piracy" is one which in ordinary usage, is associated
with acts committed on the high seas. In this sense it is an
offense against the law of nations. There is no intention, how-
ever, that the meaning and interpretation of this subsection
shall be influenced in any way by precedents or interpreta-
tions relating to "piracy on the high seas." In recent weeks,
because of news reports in the press and on TV and radio,
the term "piracy," along with the term "hijacking," has come
to be associated with the incidents that have occurred in
which individuals, by force or violence or threats thereof, have
taken over the control of aircraft and forced the pilot and
other flight crew members to do their bidding, often at risk
of life to crew and passengers. Therefore, in defining this
particular offense it seemed both convenient and desirable
to use the term "piracy. 1
The law made aircraft piracy punishable by death under certain
circumstances or "by imprisonment for not less than twenty
years, if the death penalty is not imposed."' 2 Other sections made
it a crime to assault, threaten, intimidate or interfere with flight-
crewmembers13 and prohibited the carriage of concealed weapons
by unauthorized persons.' 4 The maximum penalty for carrying
concealed weapons was a $1,000 fine or a year in prison, or both. 15
The law also authorized an air carrier, subject to reasonable FAA
rules, to refuse to transport persons or property that it believed
would endanger safety in flight.'6
It should be noted that while the hijacking incidents provided
the impetus for rapid action on the part of the Congress, the
United States Government had for some time been concerned
with the problems of crimes committed on board aircraft. Prior
to the "aircraft piracy" amendments to the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958, certain modifications had been made in the domestic
law of the United States in order to extend the Federal special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction to include aircraft in flight.'7
n H.R. RPB. No. 958, 87 Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1961).
1249 U.S.C. § 1472(i)(L) (1964).
18 49 U.S.C. § 1472(i).
14 49 U.S.C. § 1472(1).
15 49 U.S.C. § 1472(1).
16 49 U.S.C. § 1511.
17 18 U.S.C. § 7(5).
19701
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In 1950, in the case of United States v. Cordova,"8 it became
apparent that certain jurisdictional problems arose where crimes
were committed aboard aircraft in flight over the high seas. The
Cordova case concerned two passengers aboard an American air-
craft over the high seas who assaulted each other, and when the
captain intervened, assaulted him. Cordova was brought to trial
under the provisions of the special maritime and territorial juris-
diction of the United States.19 However, the court dismissed the
case for lack of jurisdiction, since the plane was not a "vessel"
within the terms of the statute.20 Moreover, the court was
cognizant of the fact that the statute referred to the "high seas"
but not to the air above the waters.21 As a result of the Cordova
decision, Congress added a new subsection to the law extending
Federal jurisdiction to aircraft owned by the United States, its
citizens and corporations "while such aircraft is in flight over the
high seas or over any other waters within the admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction of the United States, and out of the juris-
diction of any particular state."2
An additional significant defect in the law was brought to
light by an incident aboard a United Air Lines flight bound from
Chicago to Los Angeles on July 8, 1961. An intoxicated passenger
assaulted the captain of the aircraft with a knife, but was subdued
by the captain and another passenger before he could inflict any
actual harm. The knife incident was believed to have occurred
over the State of Nevada. The passenger was arrested upon
landing in Los Angeles and taken to a local court where he
pleaded guilty to being intoxicated in a public place and was
sentenced to 90 days in jail. It was found that the provisions of
18 U.S.C. § 7(5) could not be applied since that section expressly
provides for Federal jurisdiction over an aircraft in flight "out of
the jurisdiction of any particular state."23 There was much con-
fusion over which state law to apply. This confusion led Senator
Clair Engle of California to state:
1889 F. Supp. 298 (E.D.N.Y. 1950).
19 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1940).
20 89 F. Supp. at 302.
21 Id., at 303.
2 2 Supra note 17. For legislative history and purpose of this act see H.R. EP,.
No. 2257, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1952).23 Supra note 17.
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At the present time, jurisdiction ... rests with the State
over which commercial planes are flying at the time an inci-
dent occurs. However, existing law is too often unworkable
because the precise location of the crime cannot always be
determined, because the crime may extend over multiple juris-
dictions and because officers at the termination point of
flights do not have authority to enforce laws of other States.
24
Thus, while the 1961 amendments to the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958 were enacted in order to make the act of hijacking a
Federal criminal offense, they were also designed to resolve the
jurisdictional difficulty to which Senator Engle referred. As
stated by the court in United States v. Healy:
[O]ne of the... purposes of the aircraft piracy amendment
was to provide a solution to the jurisdictional problems in-
volved in fixing a locus for a crime committed in transit and
in arresting a deplaning passenger who may have engaged in
criminal activity over the territory or a different State .... 25
In addition to these regulatory and legislative actions, other
steps were being taken to counteract the hijacking threat. In
August, 1961, in testimony before the Aviation Subcommittee of
the Senate Commerce Committee, Najeeb Halaby, then Adminis-
trator of the Federal Aviation Agency, told the Congress:
In July we flashed the alarm about the hijacking threat to
all of the airlines. Senator Pastore, we directed the air carriers
to lock and bar that door at first on those flights operationally
capable of reaching Cuba, and secondly on all flights. We
intend, and I believe the air carriers intend, to tighten up the
security of the cockpit and, wherever possible, to control
access through that door from within the cockpit rather than
without.
This is not an easy problem. That door was a sort of
peaceable door. It is light in construction. A heavy man can
charge it and break through. And the air carriers are this
minute in the act of trying to make a more difficult barrier
there.
24 Hearings on S. 2268, S. 2375, and S. 2374 Before the Aviation Subcomm.
of the House Comm. on Commerce, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1961).
25 376 U.S. 75 (1964).
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Second, and I want to be clear on this one, we have
authorized the air carriers to arm the crew only if the crev
has recent training in the use of sidearms and is believed to
be demonstrably proficient in their use. We do not want a
man unproficient in the use of automatic arms in the cockpit.
There seems to be some confusion in the last 24 hours
perhaps that I or the President had directed the arming of
the crew members. This is not the case. We have authorized
them to go back to the early practice in the airlines when
the pilot and the copilot carried sidearms because they had
been deputized as postal inspectors. They were flying "gun"
on the mail. In recent years that has not been the case. We
have simply said that if the air carriers in their own judgment
wish to arm their crew, they may do so only if recent training
and demonstrable proficiency is present.
We have also authorized the air carriers to carry in the
cab or in the cockpit armed guards. In at least one case this
is so.
We have offered yesterday, through the Department of
Justice-"we" being the President and the executive branch-
a $10,000 reward for anyone giving to the local office of the
Justice Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation
information leading to the apprehension of an individual at-
tempting one of the crimes covered by this bill.
A third thing we have done, working in collaboration with
the air carriers through their very able Air Transport As-
sociation here in Washington, is to tighten up on the sur-
veillance and observation of enplaning passengers, to keep
them off the airplane before they get inside and making the
trouble. This is difficult.
What we have told them is not to leave this up to a ticket
taker at the counter but to have a senior supervisor, an indi-
vidual on duty, particularly during this period, who will ob-
serve enplaning passengers and when there is reason to be-
lieve they are carrying concealed weapons or intending to
commit a crime, or a violation of our regulations, that they
immediately bring in the local law enforcement official and
turn the search and seizure, if necessary, over to that official.
The Justice Department has very helpfully and wisely
alerted law enforcement officials all over the United States
to collaborate with the airlines in this matter. So we have
[Vol. 59
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adopted a graduated action, a series of actions to fit the
crime and the threat.
We can go on if it becomes necessary. We could, for
example, cause every enplaning passenger for a flight who
was capable of flying on to Cuba while hijacked, every
passenger to submit to a complete inspection of his person
and effects. You can readily imagine the line that would
extend from the ticket counter at Miami International Airport
if every person, man, woman, and child, had to submit to the
kind of inspection that a police official might require to be
sure that there were no concealed weapons.
So we have that under consideration with the air carriers.
We feel that it is a very drastic step, and perhaps may not be
in order at this time.
The final step that has been thought about, but not acti-
vated, is the stationing of uniformed U.S. guards on selected
flights. If we need to, that is one additional step.
26
On August 3, 1961, the agency sent a wire to the airlines
requesting that the cockpit door on all airline aircraft be kept
locked to prevent unauthorized persons from entering the flight
deck.2 7 The airlines also were authorized to provide sidearms to
properly-trained crewmembers28 and $10,000 reward was offered
through the Department of Justice for information leading to the
arrest of potential hijackers.29
In the fall of 1961 the FAA, in cooperation with the Depart-
ment of Justice, initiated the "Peace Officers Program.""0 Better
known as "sky marshals," these men are graduates of a special
training course at the U.S. Border Patrol Academy in Port Isabel,
Texas, and are trained to prevent hijackings aboard the aircraft
which they have been assigned to ride either on request from the
airline company or the FBI. They were first sworn in as Special
U.S. Deputy Marshals by the then Attorney General Robert F.
Kennedy on March 27, 1962.
On May 7, 1964, the FAA adopted a rule requiring that the
cockpit doors on all airline and other commercial aircraft be kept
20 Supra note 24, at 12.
2 7 Telegram from FAA Administrator N. E. Halaby to 30 airline presidents,
Aug. 3, 1961.28Id.
29 Id.
30 For a description of the program see 2 F.A.A. AvxATioN NEws 6 (1963).
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locked in flight. The rule became effective on August 6 of that
year.
3 1
Immediately after these actions the incidents of hijacking
diminished until late 196732 when hijacking began increasing,
reaching epidemic cresendo in 1968 and 1969. U.S. aircraft were
being hijacked to Cuba at an almost unbelievable rate.' While
the reaction to the earlier rash of hijackings was to create a legal
framework within the United States to punish and deter hijackers,
it became apparent that this framework was being rendered
impotent because the hijacker had found a "safe haven" from
U.S. jurisdiction.34 Consequently, the United States Government
began focusing all of the disciplines available in searching out a
solution-legal, engineering, medical, informational and diplo-
matic.
TBm U.S. REsPoNsE-A SECOND EFFORT
Having established a legal framework within which hijackers
are subject to prosecution and punishment, the United States
again in the closing years of the decade concentrated its efforts
on the development of methods to prevent hijacking from
occurring. The Federal Aviation Administrator of the Department
of Transportation is charged with promotion of safety in air
commerce.35 To meet this responsibility the FAA and its prede-
cessor agencies have delved into all aspects of the physical en-
vironment of aviation with the view to making it as safe as
possible. That agency, by a process of education, and armed
with a pervasive regulatory scheme,3 6 had taken steps to ensure
that the hazards to air transportation were eliminated wherever
they could be identified: the aircraft itself had to be airworthy
31 For current applicable Federal Aviation Regulation see 14 C.F.R. § 121.587
(1970 Supp.).
32 During 1962, 1963 and 1964 no U.S. air carrier aircraft was hijacked.
Four hijackings of U.S. air carrier aircraft occurred in 1965 and none in 1966 and
1967. (Statistics supplied by the Federal Aviation Administration's Office of Air
Transportation Security.)
33 During 1968 there were 18 successful hijackings of U.S. aircraft (13 air
carrier and 5 general aviation aircraft). In 1969 there were 33 successful hijack-
ings of U.S. aircraft. All were air carrier aircraft. (Statistics supplied by the
Federal Aviation Administration's Office of Air Transportation Security.)
34Th destination of the vast majority of U.S. hijackers has been Cuba-a
country with which the U.S. does not maintain diplomatic relations.
35 49 U.S.C. § 1303(a).
36 TheFederal Aviation Regulations consist of 189 separate parts. 14 C.F.R.
Parts 1 through 189 (1970 Supp.).
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and properly maintained, the crews were required to maintain
competency and proficiency, and the system of communication
had to be an efficient as the state of the art permitted. However,
this new hazard to safety-"the hijacker"-was to become char-
acterized as "our most frustrating safety problem."37 For unlike
the aircraft and crews which could be physically tested to ensure
the maximum degree of safety, all passengers boarding an aircraft
could not be placed in a "wind tunnel" to determine who, if any,
might be a hijacker. Or could they?
The Federal Aviation Administration created a Special Hijack-
ing Task Force38 charged with the responsibility of seeking a
solution to the problem of hijacking. This Task Force and other
elements of the FAA began examining several means of searching
out weapons which could possibly be concealed on passengers or
in baggage and could be used to hijack or destroy commercial
aircraft. Among such methods considered was the use of X-ray,
radar, electromagnetic detection devices and magnetometers. In-
deed, the American public, also aroused by the increasing frus-
tration in dealing with the hijacking problem, was coming forth
with suggestions. According to the Preliminary Report on Air-
craft Piracy by the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, the following ten suggestions were most frequently
submitted by the public:
1. Provide free transportation to Cuba for those persons
desiring to leave the United States.
2. Have armed guards stationed aboard each U.S. air
carrier passenger flight.
3. Offer a substantial reward to Castro for the return of
hijackers to the United States.
4. Build a simulated Havana airport in Florida, man it
with U.S. military personnel disguised as Cuban militiamen to
deceive and apprehend hijackers.
5. Bulletproof the pilot's compartment and only have
communications one way-from the cockpit to the cabin.
6. Search every passenger either physically by X-ray or
fluoroscope or through the use of metal detectors.
7. Have the pilots depressurize the aircraft until everyone
37 Federal Aviation Administration Press Release 69-25 (Feb. 28, 1969).
38 The Task Force was established in Feb. 1969 by direction of the Acting
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration.
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goes to sleep or expel a sleeping gas throughout the cabin to
put everyone to sleep. The crew would go on oxygen and
later disarm the hijacker.
8. Equip all crewmembers with Mace which would be
used to immobilize the hijacker.
9. Equip guards or crewmembers with a tranquilizer dart
gun similar to that used on "Daktari" to put animals to sleep
so that they can be captured.
10. Require an identification card or air passport of
people that wish to buy tickets on U.S.-scheduled air carriers.
Applications for identification cards would be thoroughly
screened prior to being issued the card.39
These efforts resulted in the development by the FAA of what
has been described an anti-hijacking system. Dr. H. L. Reighard,
Deputy Federal Air Surgeon of the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion, in testifying in November, 1969 before a Subcommittee of
the House and Interstate Foreign Commerce Committee in re-
sponse to inquiries concerning efforts to prevent hijacking,
described a system as follows:
It consists of a behavioral profile of the proposed char-
acteristics of past hijackers which can be applied by the air-
lines personnel. Application of this profile will clear for
boarding more than 99 percent of passengers who travel
domestically on U.S. airlines. This means we are left with
possibly 1 percent of passengers about whom we still have
some concern. They then pass through a metal screening
device which does give an indication of the presence of metal
depending on its mass and whether it is a weapon or some
other similar sized ferrous metal object.
When the device gives an indication, at that point we are
not certain as to whether it is a weapon or some other similar
ferrous metal mass. However, the device has been refined
technically to the point that it does not give an indication for
a belt buckle, a fountain pen, a wrist watch, or any other
ordinary objects likely to be carried by a passenger.40
Should application of the system identify a possible hijacker, he is
then asked to show any metal objects which he might be carrying
on his person or in his hand luggage and, if necessary, to submit
39 Supra note 3, Appendix 8.
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to a search. The question arises, of course, as to the basis upon
which such a request can be made and what happens if a person
refuses to permit such a search. As was noted earlier, the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958 was amended in 1961 to permit air carriers,
subject to reasonable rules and regulations by the Administrator
of the FAA, to refuse to transport persons or property that they
believed would endanger safety in flight.4 1 The Act provides
that every air carrier and every foreign air carrier shall file
tariffs with the Civil Aeronautics Board detailing rates, fares,
and charges for air transportation and further indicating to the
extent required by regulations of the Board, all classifications,
rules, regulations, practices and services in connection with such
air transportation.42 Present domestic carrier passenger rules for
a number of U.S. carriers provide as follows:
1. Rule 3 "ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF PASSEN-
GERS AND BAGGAGE. Passengers and their baggage are
subject to inspection with an electronic detector with or with-
out the passenger's consent or knowledge."
2. Rule 6 "REFUSAL TO TRANSPORT,
(A) Carrier will refuse to transport or will remove at any
point, any passenger...
(2) . . . whose conduct, status, age, or mental or
physical condition is such as to...
(b) make such refusal or removal necessary for the
reasonable safety or comfort of other passengers; or
(c) involve any unusual hazard or risk to himself or to
other persons ... or to property.
(3) who refuses to permit search of his person or
property for explosives or a concealed, deadly, or
dangerous weapon or article . . .
(C) Liability Carrier is not liable for its refusal to
transport any passenger or for its removal of any
passenger in accordance with the preceding para-
graphs of this rule... .43
40 Hearings on H.R. 14301 before the Subcomm. on Transportation and Aero-
nautics of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., Ser. 91-26, at 13 (1969).
4149 U.S.C. § 1511 (1964).
4249 U.S.C. § 1373 (1964).
43Local and Joint Passenger Rules Tariff No. PR-5, CAB No. 117, p. 9,
effective Oct. 27. 1968.
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Thus, as part of the contract of carriage, a carrier may refuse
transportation to a passenger who refuses to permit search of his
person or property. This anti-hijacking system has been employed
on a voluntary basis since 1968 by a number of U.S. domestic
and flag carriers.44 The system represents a positive step forward
in preventing would-be hijackers from boarding U.S. air carrier
aircraft.
A new and dangerous breed of hijacker emerged in September,
1970 when members of a Palestinian underground group seized
four aircraft and diverted three of them to the Jordanian desert.
45
One of the aircraft was flown to Beirut and then to Cairo where,
after the passengers were discharged, the aircraft was destroyed. 46
These series of hijackings introduced a new form of threat to
civil aviation for the hijackings were part of a political stratagem
by which the aircraft and its passengers were to be held hostages
until certain members of that underground group who were
imprisoned in other countries were released. Thus, aircraft and
passengers became the pawns in a game of international black-
mail. This action so incensed the United States that President
Nixon, on September 11, 1970, issued the following statement:
The menace of air piracy must be met-immediately and effec-
tively. I am therefore announcing the following actions to
deal with this problem:
1. To protect United States citizens and others on U.S.
flag carriers, we will place specially trained, armed United
States government personnel on flights of U.S. commercial
airliners. A substantial number of such personnel are already
available and they will begin their duties immediately. To
the extent necessary they will be supplemented by specially
trained members of the Armed Forces who will serve until
an adequate force of civilian guards has been assembled and
trained. We will also make anti-sabotage training available
to airlines personnel.
2. I have directed the Department of Transportation to have
American flag carriers extend the use of electronic surveil-
lance equipment and other surveillance techniques to all
44 In 1969 Eastern Airlines became the first air carrier to employ the system.45 Tnvm, Sept. 21, 1970, at 18.
46 Id,
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gateway airports and other appropriate airports in the United
States and-wherever possible-in other countries. The Fed-
eral government will provide enforcement officers to work
with this equipment, to conduct searches when appropriate
and to make necessary arrests. Such equipment and tech-
niques have already helped to reduce the problem of air
piracy in many areas.
3. I have directed the Departments of Transportation, Treas-
ury and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Science and Technology
and other agencies to accelerate their present efforts to de-
velop security measures, including new methods for detecting
weapons and explosive devices. At the same time, the De-
partments of Defense and Transportation will work with all
U.S. airlines in determining whether certain metal detectors
and x-ray devices now available to the military could provide
immediate improvement in airport surveillance efforts. To
facilitate passenger surveillance, appropriate agencies of the
Federal government will intensify their efforts to assemble
and evaluate all useful intelligence concerning this matter
and to disseminate such information to airlines and law
enforcement personnel.
4. I am directing the State Department and other appropriate
agencies to consult fully with foreign governments and foreign
carriers concerning the full range of techniques which they
use to foil hijackers. Some foreign airlines-though they are
particularly susceptible to hijacking-have been successful in
deterring hijackers and in coping with piracy attempts. We
want to learn all we can from their experience.
5. It is imperative that all countries accept the multilateral
convention providing for the extradition or punishment of
hijackers which will be considered at the International Con-
ference which will be held under the auspices of the Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization. I affirm the support
of the United States both for this Convention and for the
Tokyo Convention, which provides for the prompt return of
hijacked aircraft, passengers and crew. I call upon other
governments to become parties to these conventions.
I further call upon the international community to take joint
action to suspend airline services with those countries which
refuse to punish or extradite hijackers involved in inter-
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national blackmail. For this purpose and in order to con-
sider other ways and means of meeting this new international
menace, I have directed the Secretary of State to ask the
President of the Council of the International Civil Aviation
Organization immediately to convene that Council in an
emergency meeting.
6. It is the policy of the United States government to hold the
countries in which hijacked planes are landed responsible
for taking appropriate steps to protect the lives and the prop-
erty of U.S. citizens.
7. An additional indication of our deep concern with the
hijacking menace is the request which the United States and
the United Kingdom made earlier this week for an urgent
meeting of the United Nations Security Council to consider
this problem. I am gratified by the unanimous action of the
Security Council in calling upon the parties concerned im-
mediately to release all hijacked passengers and crews. I am
pleased, too, that the Security Council has asked all nations
to take all possible legal steps to protect against further hi-
jackings or other interference in international civil aviation.
* * * *
These are not the only steps we will take in the coming
months to meet the threat of airplane hijacking. But they
do provide a decisive program for the immediate future. The
Secretary of Transportation will direct this program and
take responsibility for preparing further proposals. In this
capacity he will work closely with the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, and the
Secretary of Defense.
Piracy is not a new challenge for the community of nations.
Most countries, including the United States, found effective
means of dealing with piracy on the high seas a century and
a half ago. We can-and we will-deal effectively with
piracy in the skies today.47
Following this Presidential directive, a special office4" was
established in the Department of Transportation and charged
with the implementation of the President's directive insofar as it
47 Press Release Office of the White House Press Secretary, Sept. 11, 1970.
48 Office of Civil Aviation Security. The President appointed retired Air Force
Lt. Qen. Benjamin 0. Davis, Jr., Director of Civil Aviation Security.
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related to a development and implementation of measures to
prevent hijacking.4 As a result, the use of the anti-hijacking
system has been further expanded and specially trained sky mar-
shals are now riding on U.S. aircraft.5
Hence, in the course of a decade the United States Govern-
ment, in its efforts to combat aircraft hijacking, has enacted
penal legislation, promulgated regulatory controls, and devel-
oped a systems approach on the ground and in the air to thwart
the would-be hijacker. While these measures were being taken
by the United States, the world community, at times led prin-
cipally by United States' initiatives, was also responding to the
hijacking problem.
ThE INTERNATiONAL RESPONSE
The Tokyo Convention
The international community had since 1950 been struggling
with the problems created by crimes committed on board aircraft.
The Legal Committee of the International Civil Aviation Orga-
nization began a study of the problem in 1950, and in 1958 devel-
oped a draft of an international convention on the subject of
crimes aboard aircraft. This Convention eventually evolved into
what has been popularly called the Tokyo Convention.51 Funda-
mentally, the Convention is a jurisdictional one which has for
its principal purpose the establishment of a positive rule of inter-
national law between the Contracting Parties that the State in
which the aircraft is registered is competent to exercise jurisdic-
tion over crimes committed on board that aircraft while it is in
flight.52 Additionally, the Convention deals with the role of the
aircraft commander and his powers relevant to the acts of
offenders relative to criminal acts or acts endangering the safety
of the aircraft which occur on board; granting the commander
appropriate authority to cope with such situations and affording
49 Supra note 45.50 For a general discussion of steps taken to expand initially the sky marshal
program see AvIToIN WEEK AND SPAcE TECMNOLOGY, Sept. 28, 1970, at 26.
51 Formally titled "Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed
on Board Aircraft." For a detailed analysis of the Convention see Boyle & Pulsifer,
"The Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft," 30 J. Am L. & Com. 305 (1964).5 2 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Air-
craft, Art. 3, TIAS No. 6768, 20 U.S.T. 2941.
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him a basis of protection in any proceedings brought against him
for reasonable acts in handling such matters. Similar protection
is extended to members of the crew.53 While the Convention does
not attempt to make aircraft hijacking an international crime, it
does contain provisions which obligate the country in which a
hijacked aircraft lands to restore the hijacked aircraft to those
entitled to its possession and which impose an obligation on
Contracting States to permit passengers and crew of such aircraft
to continue their journey as soon as practicable.54 The inclusion
of these particular provisions was a result of United States' efforts,
and the reason for their introduction into the Convention can be
traced to the series of hijackings of U.S. aircraft which occurred
in 1961.1" These facets of the Convention gained particular
importance during the late 1960s.56 The United States ratified
the Tokyo Convention in 1969 and with its deposit of ratification,
the Convention came into force as between Contracting States
in December 1969.
57
53 Id.,Arts. 5-10.
54 Id., Art. 11.
55 Report of the United States Delegation to the Diplomatic Conference on
Air Law held under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organization,
Tokyo, Japan, Aug.-Sept. at 33 (1963).
56 With the increase in hijackings there was growing concern for the safety
of the hijacked passengers, crew and aircraft. Adherence to the principles of
Article 11 of the Convention became the subject of ICAO and U.N. resolutions.
57 There are now over 30 parties to the Convention. In connection with the
ratification of the Convention it became necessary for the U.S. to amend again
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 in order to enable the .US. to meet its obliga-
tions thereunder. Public Law 91-449, 91st Cong., provided that-
(1) A new subsection (32) be inserted in section 101 of the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. 1301) as follows:
"(32) The term 'special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States'
includes the following aircraft while in flight-
:'(a) civil aircraft of the United States;
,,(b) aircraft of the national defense forces of the United States; and
(C) any other aircraft-
"(i) within the United States, or
"ii) outside the United States which has its next scheduled
destination or last point of departure in the United States provided
that in either case it next actually lands in the United States.
For the purpose of this definition, an aircraft is considered to be in flight
from the moment when power is appliedfor the purpose of takeoff until
the moment when the landing run ends."
(2) Existing subsections (32), (33), (34), and (35) are renum-
bered (33), (34), (35), and (36), respectively.
(3) Subsections 902(i), Ci), and (k) of such Act (49 U.S.C. 1472
(i), (j), and (k)) are amended by de eting the words "in flight in air
commerce" wherever they a ppear in those subsections and substituting
therefor the words "within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United
States."
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Extradition or Prosecution: Removal of
the Safe Haven by the Hague Convention
While the Tokyo Convention was signed by the United States
in 1963, the impetus for its ratification in 1969 was the alarming
increase in U.S. air carrier aircraft hijackings during 1968 and
1969. In that period of time there were 51 successful hijackings
and 11 aborted attempts. 5
8
The world community was now beginning to show an aware-
ness of the magnitude of the problem. The Sixteenth Session of
the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization
held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in September 1968, passed the
following Resolution:
Unlawful seizure of civil aircraft
WHEREAS unlawful seizure of civil aircraft has a serious
adverse effect on the safety, efficiency and
regularity of air navigation,
NOTING that Article 11 of the Tokyo Convention on
Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed
on Board Aircraft provides certain remedies
for the situation envisaged,
BEING however of the opinion that this Article does
not provide a complete remedy,
THE ASSEMBLY
(1) Urges all States to become parties as soon as pos-
sible to the Tokyo Convention on Offences
and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft;
(2) INVITES States, even before ratification of, or adher-
ence to, the Tokyo Convention, to give effect
to the principles of Article 11 of that Con-
vention;
(3) REQUESTS the Council, at the earliest possible date, to
institute a study of other measures to cope
with the problem of unlawful seizure.59
5sStatistics supplied by the Federal Aviation Administration's Office of Air
Transportation Security.59 Resolution A-16-87 of the Sixteenth Assembly, ICAO Doc. 8779, Res. A/16
at 92.
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The Council of ICAO, in response to the request from the
Assembly contained in the Resolution, referred the subject of
unlawful seizure of aircraft to the Legal Committee of ICAO for
study. The Chairman of that Committee established a Subcom-
mittee for that purpose which met in two sessions, the first in
February 1969 and the second in September and October 1969.
The first Subcommittee meeting was attended by representatives
of the following countries: Algeria, Canada, Colombia, Denmark,
France, India, Israel, Japan, Nigeria, Switzerland, Tunisia, United
Kingdom, and United States of America.
At this meeting the United States introduced a proposal which,
if adopted, would have obligated Contracting States to extradite
hijackers of commercial airliners to the State of registration of
the hijacked aircraft. Such extradition would have been manda-
tory except in situations in which the country having custody
of the hijacker was the country of his nationality. The philosophy
underlying the U.S. proposal and all subsequent U.S. efforts
was one which would require States that were parties to any
anti-hijacking multilateral convention to adopt measures which
would eliminate for the potential hijacker the inducement of a
"safe haven." The United States failed to receive support for its
proposal. In a letter addressed to Senator Fulbright, Chairman
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, William B. Macomber,
Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, ex-
plained:
During the period February 10 through 21, 1969, a 13-
nation Subcommittee of the Legal Committee of ICAO met
on the subject of the unlawful seizure of aircraft.
There was a fundamental difference of view on the sub-
stantive issue of how to deter hijacking through an inter-
national convention. The majority of the Subcommittee be-
lieved that hijacking should be made punishable but that the
punishment should be left to normal extradition and prosecu-
tion practice. A small minority in the Subcommittee (led by
the United States) believed that a new convention should
contain its own special provisions for extradition of hijackers,
exclude political motivations of the hijacker from considera-
tion in the decision whether to extradite or prosecute, and
permit refusal of extradition under the convention only where
the State requesting it was considered to be doing so with
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political motivations. The minority proposals would also pro-
vide that if extradition were refused because of political
motivations of the State seeking extradition, the country where
the hijacker was found would be obliged to refer the case
to its local prosecuting authorities.
The United States received no support for its original
proposal calling for an unqualified obligation to extradite.
Only one country (Colombia) supported the United States
proposal that hijacking should not itself be considered a
political offense for purposes of extradition, and only two
countries (Colombia and Nigeria) supported the United States
on the proposal to create a new independent basis for extra-
dition, rather than leave it to existing law and treaties.60
The draft Agreement finally developed at this first Legal
Subcommittee meeting was one which required Contracting
States to punish or to extradite hijackers, but reserving to States
their traditional discretion as to whether or not to initiate prosecu-
tions or to extradite. The draft Agreement in the form agreed to
by the first meeting of the Subcommittee was reviewed at a
second meeting of the Subcommittee and finally by a meeting of
the full Legal Committee in March 1970. The Legal Committee
recommended that the ICAO Council convene a Diplomatic
Conference for the purpose of preparing a Convention along the
lines recommended by the Legal Subcommittee for States to sign
and ratify. The draft Convention approved was substantially in
the form adopted by the Legal Subcommittee.
The Diplomatic Conference was convened in The Hague in
December 1970 and it produced a Convention which was ap-
proved without a dissenting vote by the 77-nation Conference
(Algeria and Chile abstaining), but in a form that in the view
of the United States was stronger than that approved by the
Legal Committee (see Appendix A). In signing the Convention
for the United States, Mr. John B. Rhinelander, Deputy Legal
Adviser of the Department of State, said:
This Conference had before it the task of preparing an
effective, widely acceptable international Convention; a Con-
vention designed to ensure that all hijackers, wherever found,
0S. REP. No. 3, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 31 (1969).
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will be severely punished for an act which endangers the
safety and lives of all passengers and crew aboard....
Our Delegation believes this diplomatic conference has
achieved its objective, and that this result will be insured
when states have ratified or acceded to the Convention and
it has become widely accepted....
The Convention provides that if a state does not extradite
a hijacker, it will submit the case, without exception whatso-
ever, to its competent authorities for the purpose of prose-
cution. This obligation is emphatic, and applies whatever the
motivation of the hijacker ...
The Convention provides hijacking will be subject to severe
penalties in all states....
The Convention provides for universal criminal jurisdiction
over hijackers, wherever found, by obligating contracting
states to establish criminal jurisdiction enabling each state
to prosecute a hijacker if that state does not extradite him.
This provision-akin to the response of states in prior years
to the threat of piracy-is one of the most important features
in the entire Convention, and was added at this Conference.
For the first time, the hijackers will be subject to punish-
ment regardless of where the hijacking took place....
Finally, the Convention will facilitate extradition of hi-
jackers between contracting states....
In brief, this Convention deprives hijackers of asylum
from prosecution. A hijacker will either be extradited for
purposes of prosecution or prosecuted where found.6'
The Convention was signed at The Hague by 50 of the 77 par-
ticipants (see Appendix A). If ratified, or adhered to, by the
nations of the world, this Convention will represent a significant
step forward in the battle against hijacking.
The 1970 ICAO Assembly in Montreal: Resolutions
and a Declaration
While this Convention represents substantial progress, much
remains to be done. The diplomatic efforts designed to deter
hijacking have concentrated on eliminating various "safe havens"
for the hijackers. This is a deterrent concept. There is also the
concept of prevention.
61 Dept. of State Press Release No. 352 (Dec. 16, 1970).
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In early 1970, two European commercial aircraft carrying
passengers were blown up.62 These incidents shocked and aroused
the world community. No longer were attacks-hijacking or
otherwise-on civil aviation merely the United States' problem.
Eleven European nations called for an extraordinary and urgent
meeting of the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation
Organization.6 3 The need for the meeting was best summarized
in a July 8 News Release of the International Civil Aviation
Organization:
Grim facts reveal the need for action. From the beginning
of 1969 until the end of June 1970, there were 118 incidents
of unlawful seizure of civil aircraft and 14 incidents of sab-
otage and armed attacks against civil aviation. These involved
airlines of 47 nations around the world with more than 7,000
passengers representing 83 different nationalities. In this
period, 96 people were killed and 57 injured as a result of
such unlawful acts as "hijacking," sabotage and armed at-
tacks. These facts emphasize that unlawful interference with
civil aviation and its facilities is not the particular problem
of any one nation or of any one region, but has exploded
into a worldwide hazard to the safe development and growth
of international civil aviation.
The meeting convened in Montreal in June 1970. The stated
purpose for the assembly was-
Development of adequate security specifications and prac-
tices, for application by ICAO States in international civil
aviation, aimed at the protection of air passengers, civil avia-
tion personnel and civil aircraft by
a) preventing criminal action of any kind that may
endanger the safety of air transport; and
b) consideration of arrangements under which those
responsible for criminal actions endangering civil air
transport can be brought to justice.
64
62 One was a Swissair aircraft destined for Tel Aviv which crashed after
exploding, killing 47 persons. The other was an Austrian Airlines aircraft which,
while damaged, managed to land safely at Frankfurt. For a report on the after-
math see ThdE, March 9, 1970, at 26.
6 Austria, Belgium, Denmark the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland,
and Kingdom of the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the
United Kingdom.
64ICAO Doc. 8895, Res. A/17 at 5.
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Ninety-one of the one hundred and nine.teen Member States
of ICAO and twelve international organizations attended this
Assembly as well as the U.S.S.R., which at that time was not a
Member State but which subsequently joined the organization.
The work of the Assembly focused on consideration of three areas
-the development of security responsibility for international air-
ports; preventive security measures for use against hijacking,
sabotage, and armed attacks against civil aviation and its facilities;
and, finally, the possibility of the need for international treaties to
deal with these problem areas. The Assembly was generally con-
sidered a success and was marked by an atmosphere of world-
wide cooperation. The United States played a leading role at
this meeting which produced resolutions calling on States to take
the following actions:
SECURITY MEASURES
a) Unlawful Seizure of Civil Aircraft
i) Development and implementation of detection system
and procedures for use against 'hijackers,' and for
weapons. These range from highly sophisticated tech-
nological detection apparatus, to training of aviation in-
dustry personnel in the basic physchological behavior
characteristics of 'hijackers,' etc.
ii) Development and implementation of measures to be
taken by aircraft crew in flight and ground-based facili-
ties during an act of unlawful seizure.
iii) Development and implementation of measures to be
taken on the ground during an act of unlawful seizure,
i.e., when seized aircraft lands in transit for fuel, etc.
iv) Development and implementation of adequate an-
nouncement in airport areas to warn and discourage
potential 'hijackers.'
v) Development of cooperation with public information
media to warn and discourage potential prepetrators
from unlawful acts against civil aviation.
b) Sabotage
i) Development and implementation of adequate systems
and procedures for detecting explosive devices in air-
mail, air cargo and passenger baggage, and their dis-
posal when found.
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ii) Development and implementation of adequate protec-
tion of 'clean' mail, cargo and baggage throughout
process from inspection to delivery aboard aircraft.
iii) Development and implementation of adequate inspec-
tion and protection of aircraft on the ground, as well as
vital ground-based facilities used for flight guidance
and control operations.
iv) Development and implementation of adequate security
isolation areas at airports for aircraft in high risk situa-
tions.
v) Development and implementation of adequate security
clearance and identification of air transport industry
personnel in airport areas.
vi) Development and implementation of adequate areas
and procedures for isolating transit passengers from air-
port visitors, and incoming and departing passengers,
in order to minimize certain possible risks.
vii) Development and implementation of adequate emerg-
ency measures to be taken in case of an explosion oc-
curring in an aircraft, either in flight or on the ground,
by flight crew, air traffic controllers, airport authorities,
etc.
c) Armed Attacks
i) Development and implementation of adequate surveil-
liance systems and procedures over airport area, air-
port perimeter, and surrounding area.
ii) Development and implementation of adequate physical
protection for passengers and aircraft on the ground,
during take-off from runways, and during flight ap-
proach and landing operations.
iii) Development and implementation of adequate high-
security isolation areas for passengers and aircraft on
the ground, in the case of high-risk situations.
iv) Development and implementation of strengthened air-
port security systems and guard personnel, i.e., surveil-
lance, monitoring, electrical fencing, armed patrols, etc.
LEGAL ACTION
i) Development of a special international treaty on unlaw-
ful interference with civil aviation, dealing with sab-
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otage and other violent unlawful acts. This has been
stressed as urgent, with draft treaty to be prepared by
the ICAO Legal Committee in late 1970, for a Diplo-
matic Conference in mid-1971 to bring it to conclusion.
ii) Early ratification of ICAO treaty on Unlawful Seizure,
which is now scheduled for preparation by a Diplomatic
Conference in December at The Hague. This treaty
calls for return of aircraft to control of its commander,
assistance to passengers and crew for continuation of
their journey, and the apprehension, prosecution or ex-
tradition of the 'hijacker.'
iii) Enactment of national legislation in all States, where
such legislation does not yet exist, to apply severe
penalties for the unlawful seizure of aircraft and other
forms of unlawful interference with international civil
aviation and its facilities.
Finally, the Assembly adopted a declaration by which it-
CONDEMNS
CONDEMNS
URGENTLY
CALLS UPON
URGENTLY
CALLS UPON
SOLEMNLY
(1)
all acts of violence which may be directed
against aircraft, aircraft crews and passen-
gers engaged in international civil air trans-
port;
all acts of violence which may be directed
against civil aviation personnel, civil airports
and other facilities used by international civil
air transport;
States not to have recourse, under any cir-
cumstances, to acts of violence directed
against international civil air transport and
airports and other facilities serving such
transport;
States, pending the coming into force of ap-
propriate international conventions, to take
effective measures to deter and prevent such
acts and to ensure, in accordance with their
national laws, the prosecution of those who
commit such acts.
Deplores acts which undermine the confi-
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dence placed in air transport by the peoples
of the world.
(2) Expresses regret for the loss of life and injury
and damage to important economic resources
caused by such acts.
(3) Condemns all acts of violence which may be
directed against aircraft, crews and passen-
gers engaged in, and against civil aviation
personnel, civil airports and other facilities
used by, international civil air transport.
(4) Recognizes the urgent need for a consensus
among States in order to secure widespread
international cooperation in the interests of
the safety of international civil air transport.
(5) Requests concerted action on the part of
States toward suppressing all acts which
jeopardize the safe and orderly development
of international civil air transport.
(6) Requests application, as soon as possible, of
the decisions and recommendations of this
Assembly so as to prevent and deter such
acts.
65
With the collective opinion apparent in these resolutions, it ap-
pears that the world community was finally mobilizing its forces
to combat aircraft hijacking and other acts of unlawful inter-
ference against civil aviation and the facilities used by civil
aviation.
Proposals to Counteract International Blackmail
Two months after the close of the meeting, however, new
terror was injected into the aviation atmosphere-hijacking for
purposes of international blackmail. As pointed out earlier in
discussing the United States' response to the hijacking problem,
in early September 1970 four commercial jet airlines and their
passengers were hijacked to the Mid-East. The world waited
anxiously for days to see whether both the hostage passengers
and aircraft would survive. The passengers were eventually
65 July 3, 1970 News Release of the International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion. For the complete texts of Resolutions passed by the Assembly see ICAO
Doc. 8895 Res. A/17.
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released. It became clear to the United States that more was
needed for effective world action than international conventions
calling on States to punish hijackers and saboteurs. What was also
needed, particularly in cases involving hijacking for international
blackmail purposes, was an international response which would
impose sanctions against States which did not take action to
punish the perpetrators of such acts.
In late September 1970, in response to a Resolution of the
Extraordinary Assembly of ICAO,66 the ICAO Legal Committee
met in London for the purpose of drafting a Convention dealing
with acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation and its
facilities other than acts of unlawful seizure of aircraft. This
meeting was scheduled to last for approximately two weeks, but
was dramatically extended as a result of President Nixon's de-
cision to move forcefully on all fronts to combat the latest series
of outrages committed against international civil aviation. At
the request of the United States, a Special Meeting of the Council
of the International Civil Aviation Organization was convened in
Montreal on September 18, 1970. The United States placed
before the Council the following draft Resolution:
THE COUNCIL,
FINDING that a heightened threat to the safety and
security of international civil air transport exists as a result of
acts of unlawful seizure of aircraft involving the detention for
blackmail purposes of passengers, crew and aircraft contrary
and aircraft contrary to Article II of the Toklo Convention
cluding the destruction of such aircraft) and the failure to
extradite or prosecute persons responsible for such acts;
RECOGNIZING that Contracting States to the Convention
on International Civil Aviation have obligated themselves to
ensure the safe and orderly growth of international civil
aviation throughout the world;
CALLS UPON Contracting States in order to ensure the
safety and security of international civil air transport to take
joint action to suspend all international civil air transport
services to and from any State which, after the unlawful
seizure of an aircraft, detains passengers, crew and aircraft
contrary to the Tokyo Convention (including the destruction
66 ICAO Doc. 8895 Res. A/17 at 30.
67 Supra note 45.
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of such aircraft) or any State which fails to extradite or
prosecute persons responsible for such acts of unlawful
seizure;
DIRECTS the Legal Committee to extend its Eighteenth
Session in order to draw up an international convention pro-
viding for joint action by States to suspend all international
civil air transport services to and from any State which, after
the unlawful seizure of an aircraft, detains passengers, crew
and aircraft contrary to Article II of the Tokyo Convention
(including the destruction of such aircraft) or any State which
fails to extradite or prosecute persons responsible for such
acts of unlawful seizure.
0 8
In introducing the United States' proposal, the following
statement in explanation of the United States' position was made:
The existing draft convention on unlawful seizure of air-
craft obligates states to extradite or prosecute all persons
responsible for unlawful seizure of aircraft. We expect that
draft will be strengthened, signed at the diplomatic conference
in The Hague this December, and promptly ratified by States.
In this connection, the Montreal Declaration adopted by the
Assembly this past June deals directly and forcibly with this
point. Its text:
'URGENTLY CALLS UPON STATES, pending the com-
ing into force of appropriate international conventions, to
take effective measures to deter and prevent such acts (of
violence directed against international civil air transport and
airports and other facilities serving such transport) and to
ensure, in accordance with their national laws, the prosecution
of those who commit such acts. . ..
It is essential that the basic principles set forth in the
Tokyo Convention and the draft Unlawful Seizure Convention
be applied universally to be effective. However, there are
at the present time no agreed-upon sanctions to enforce them.
Further efforts by ICAO are now plainly required.
That is why President Nixon called upon the international
community 'to take joint action to suspend airline services
with those countries which refuse to punish or extradite
hijackers involved in international blackmail.' That is why
he directed the Secretary of State of the United States to ask
that this session be convened.
68 Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXIII, No. 1634, Oct. 19, 1970, at 453.
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The United States believes that the principal action of this
meeting should be the adoption of a resolution establishing the
basis for application of sanctions where appropriate and has
presented for your consideration a resolution for this pur-
pose.69
While the United States' Resolution was not adopted, the
Council did adopt the following Resolution:
THE COUNCIL,
Finding that a heightened threat to the safety and security
of international civil air transport exists as a result of acts of
unlawful seizure of aircraft involving the detention of passen-
gers, crew and aircraft contrary to the principles of Article II
of the Toklo Convention, for international blackmail purposes,
and the destruction of such aircraft;
Recognizing that Contracting States to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation have obligated themselves to en-
sure the safe and orderly growth of international civil aviation
throughout the world;
Calls upon Contracting States, in order to ensure the safety
and security of international civil air transport, upon request
of a Contracting State to consult together immediately with a
view to deciding what joint action should be undertaken, in
accordance with international law, without excluding meas-
ures such as the suspension of international civil air transport
services to and from any State which after the unlawful
seizure of an aircraft, detains passengers, crew or aircraft con-
trary to the principles of Article II of the Tokyo Convention,
for international blackmail purposes, or any State which,
contrary to the principles of Articles 7 and 8 of the Draft
Convention on Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, fails to extradite
or prosecute persons committing acts of unlawful seizure
for international blackmail purposes;
Directs the Legal Committee to consider during its Eigh-
teenth Session, if necessary by extension of the session, an
international convention or other international instruments:
i) to give effect to the purposes set out in the preceding
paragraph;
ii) to provide for joint action by States to take such measures
69 Id. at 451.
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as may be appropriate in other cases of unlawful seizure;
and
iii) to provide for amendment of bilateral air transport
agreements of contracting parties to remove all doubt
concerning the authority to join in taking such action
against any State. 0
As a result of an action by the Council in passing the above-
cited Resolution, the ICAO Legal Committee Meeting in London
was extended an additional ten days. The Legal Committee was
successful in drafting the text of a proposed convention on unlaw-
ful interference with civil aviation and its facilities which would
call upon Contracting States to make the following offenses pun-
ishable by severe penalties:
(1) intentionally committing an armed attack against the
life of a person on board an aircraft in flight; or
(2) intentionally destroying or seriously damaging an air-
craft in service; or
(3) intentionally damaging an aircraft in service with the
result of endangering its safety in flight; or
(4) intentionally destroying or damaging air navigation
facilities with the result of endangering the safety of
aircraft in flight; or
(5) intentionally committing an act of interference with the
operation of aeronautical communications with the result
of endangering the safety of aircraft in flight; or
(6) intentionally placing on an aircraft by mail or dispatching
of cargo or any other means whatsoever a device or sub-
stance likely to destroy or seriously damage the aircraft
in service or endanger its safety in flight; or
(7) committing any other act or omission with the intention
of endangering the safety of aircraft in flight; or
(8) attempting or conspiring to commit any of the above acts
or omissions; or
(9) being an accomplice of a person who commite or attempts
to commit any of the above acts or omissions.
71
70 Id. at 453.
71 ICAO Doo. 8910, LC/163, Part 11, Annex, Art. 1,
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In addition, the draft provisionally incorporated many of the
Articles of the then ICAO Legal Committee draft Convention on
Unlawful Seizure which was subsequently considered at the Diplo-
matic Conference in The Hague in December, 1970. Included
among these Articles are those calling upon States either to
extradite alleged offenders or to submit the case to their competent
authorities for a decision whether to prosecute him. The Council
of ICAO has called for a diplomatic conference in September,
1971, to consider this draft Convention.
At the same Session of the Legal Committee the United States
also tabled a draft "Convention Regarding the Safety and Security
of International Civil Air Transport Services." Basically, this
Convention would establish machinery for enabling States to
take joint action against another State in cases of hijackings for
international blackmail purposes. While the text of this Con-
vention was not discussed in detail, the Committee did discuss a
number of legal issues raised by such a Convention.72
The Canadian Government also introduced a proposal calling
for the inclusion in bilateral air transport agreements of a pro-
vision authorizing States party to the bilateral agreements to take
certain action in cases of violation of the provisions of Article II
of the Tokyo Convention.
The Legal Committee recommended to the Council the estab-
lishment of a special Legal Subcommittee which will meet to
consider further the question of sanctions and the United States'
and Canadian proposals. Such a meeting has now been scheduled
for April, 1971.
Thus, in the past decade the international aviation community
has moved sometimes with great urgency and sometimes with
tantalizing deliberateness to begin to form a body of international
law designed to deter or punish persons who would bring dis-
ruptive violence into the arena of international civil aviation.
CONCLUSION
As the world spins into another decade, the fight to eradicate
the disease of hijacking in all its forms and with its varied motiva-
tions continues. The United Nations continues to focus world
72 1CA0 PoQ. 8910, LC/163, Part 1H, Anex 2,
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opinion on condemning acts of hijacking. The International Civil
Aviation Organization, through its technical and legal committees,
continues to work to develop ways to combat the hijacker and
saboteur. In January, 1971, at the invitation of the United States
Government, over seventy nations from all over the world met
in Washington, D. C. for a three-day Conference to exchange
information and ideas on how to stop hijacking and sabotage of
civil aircraft. The nations of the world are beginning to enact
specific legislation making acts of hijacking a crime under their
national law. If civil aviation is to continue to be a force for
world peace and understanding, if it is to remain the most effective
means of transportation between peoples and nations yet devised
by man, if the traveling public is again to board aircraft with no
greater concern than its choice between coffee, tea, or milk, then
these efforts must continue. Hijacking must be stopped and, to
do so, the genius of man must continue to work to develop
methods whereby the would-be hijacker can be prevented from
committing the crime, and the will of the nations of the world
must combine to deprive successful hijackers of any "safe haven."
To the objectives of deterrence, prevention, and ensurement of
punishment must be added perseverance and vigilance.
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Appendix A
CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL
SEIZURE OF AIRCRAFT
[Following is the text of the Multilateral Hijacking Convention
approved by a 77-nation diplomatic conference held at The Hague,
December 1-16, 1970 and signed by the U.S. on December 16 (Press
Release Number 352). On the same date, forty-eight other countries
also signed the Convention.]
THE STATES PARTIES TO THIS CONVENTION
CONSIDERING that unlawful acts of seizure or exercise of control
of aircraft in flight jeopardize the safety of persons and property,
seriously affect the operation of air services, and undermine the
confidence of the peoples of the world in the safety of civil
aviation;
CONSIDERING that the occurrence of such acts is a matter of grave
concern;
CONSIDERING that, for the purpose of deterring such acts, there is
an urgent need to provide appropriate measures for punishment
of offenders;
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
Article 1
Any person who on board an aircraft in flight:
(a) unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or by any other form
of intimidation, seizes, or exercises control of that aircraft, or attempts
to perform any such act, or
(b) is an accomplice of a person who performs or attempts to
perform any such act,
commits an offence (hereinafter referred to as "the offence").
Article 2
Each Contracting State undertakes to make the offence punishable
by severe penalties.
Article 8
1. For the purpose of this Convention, an aircraft is considered
to be in flight at any time from the moment when all its external doors
are closed following embarkation until the moment when any such
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door is opened for disembarkation. In the case of a forced landing, the
flight shall be deemed to continue until the competent authorities
take over the responsibility for the aircraft and for persons and property
on board.
2. This Convention shall not apply to aircraft used in military,
customs or police services.
3. This Convention shall apply only if the place of take-off or the
place of actual landing of the aircraft on board which the offence is
committed is situated outside the territory of the State of registration
of that aircraft; it shall be immaterial whether the aircraft is engaged
in an international or domestic flight.
4. In the cases mentioned in Article 5, this Convention shall not
apply if the place of take-off and the place of actual landing of the
aircraft on board which the offence is committed are situated within
the territory of the same State where that State is one of these referred
to in that Article.
5. Notwithstanding paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article, Articles 6,
7, 8 and 10 shall apply whatever the place of take-off or the place of
actual landing of the aircraft, if the offender or the alleged offender
is found in the territory of a State other than the State of registration
of that aircraft.
Article 4
1. Each Contracting State shall likewise take such measures as
may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offence and any
other act of violence against passengers or crew committed by the
alleged offender in connection with the offence, in the following cases:
(a) when the offence is committed on board an aircraft regis-
tered in that State;
(b) when the aircraft on board which the offence is committed
lands in its territory with the alleged offender still on board;
(c) when the offence is committed on board an aircraft leased
without crew to a lessee who has his principal place of business
or, if the lessee has no such place of business, his permanent
residence, in that State.
2. Each Contracting State shall likewise take such measures as
may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offence in the
case where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not
extradite him pursuant to Article 8 to any of the States mentioned in
paragraph 1 of this Article.
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3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction
exercised in accordance with national law.
Article 5
The Contracting States which establish joint air transport operating
organizations or international operating agencies, which operate air-
craft which are subject to joint or international registration shall, by
appropriate means, designate for each aircraft the State among them
which shall exercise the jurisdiction and have the attributes of the
State of registration for the purpose of this Convention and shall give
notice thereof to the International Civil Aviation Organization which
shall communicate the notice to all States parties to this Convention.
Article 6
1. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, any
Contracting State in the territory of which the offender or the alleged
offender is present, shall take him into custody or take other measures
to ensure his presence. The custody and other measures shall be as
provided in the law of that State but may only be continued for such
time as is necessary to enable any criminal or extradition proceedings
to be instituted.
2. Such State shall immediately make a preliminary enquiry into
the facts.
3. Any person in custody pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article
shall be assisted in communicating immediately with the nearest
appropriate representative of the State of which he is a national.
4. When a State, pursuant to this Article, has taken a person
into custody, it shall immediately notify the State of registration of the
aircraft, the State mentioned in Article 4, paragraph 1 (c), the State of
nationality of the detained person and, if it considers it advisable, any
other interested States of the fact that such person is in custody and of
the circumstances which warrant his detention. The State which makes
the preliminary enquiry contemplated in paragraph 2 of this Article
shall promptly report its findings to the said States and shall indicate
whether it intends to exercise jurisdiction.
Article 7
The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender
is found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without excep-
tion whatsoever, and whether or not the offence was committed in its
territory, to submit the case to its competent authorities for the pur-
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pose of prosecution. Those authorities shall take their decision in
the same manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a serious
nature under the law of that State.
Article 8
1. The offence shall be deemed to be included as an extraditable
offence in any extradition treaty existing between Contracting States.
Contracting States undertake to include the offence as an extraditable
offence in every extradition treaty to be concluded between them.
2. If a Contracting State which makes extradition conditional on
the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another
Contracting State with which it has no extradition treaty, it may at its
option consider this Convention as the legal basis for extradition in
respect of the offence. Extradition shall be subject to the other condi-
tions provided by the law of the requested State.
3. Contracting States which do not make extradition conditional on
the existence of a treaty shall recognize the offence as an extraditable
offence between themselves subject to the conditions provided by the
law of the requested State.
4. The offence shall be treated, for the purpose of extradition
between Contracting States, as if it had been committed not only in the
place in which it occurred but also in the territories of the States
required to establish their jurisdiction in accordance with Article 4,
paragraph 1.
Article 9
1. When any of the acts mentioned in Article 1 (a) has occurred
or is about to occur, Contracting States shall take all appropriate
measures to restore control of the aircraft to its lawful commander or
to preserve his control of the aircraft.
2. In the cases contemplated by the preceding paragraph, any
Contracting State in which the aircraft or its passengers or crew are
present shall facilitate the continuation of the journey of the passen-
gers and crew as soon as practicable, and shall without delay return
the aircraft and its cargo to the persons lawfully entitled to possession.
Article 10
1. Contracting States shall afford one another the greatest measure
of assistance in connection with criminal proceedings brought in
respect of the offence and other acts mentioned in Article 4. The law
of the State requested shall apply in all cases.
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2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not affect
obligations under any other treaty, bilateral or multilateral, which
governs or will govern, in whole or in part, mutual assistance in
criminal matters.
Article 11
Each Contracting State shall in accordance with its national law
report to the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization
as promptly as possible any relevant information in its possession
concerning:
(a) the circumstances of the offence;
(b) the action taken pursuant to Article 9;
(c) the measures taken in relation to the offender or the alleged
offender, and, in particular, the results of any extradition pro-
ceedings or other legal proceedings.
Article 12
1. Any dispute between two or more Contracting States concern-
ing the interpretation or application of this Convention which cannot
be settled through negotiation, shall, at the request of one of them, be
submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the date of the
request for arbitration the Parties are unable to agree on the orga-
nization of the arbitration, any one of those Parties may refer the
dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in conformity
with the statute of that court.
2. Each State may at the time of signature or ratification of this
Convention or accession thereto, declare that it does not consider
itself bound by the preceding paragraph. The other Contracting States
shall not be bound by the preceding paragraph with respect to any
Contracting States having made such a reservation.
3. Any Contracting State having made a reservation in accordance
with the preceding paragraph may at any time withdraw this reserva-
tion by notification to the Depositary Governments.
Article 13
1. This Convention shall be open for signature at The Hague on
16 December 1970, by States participating in the International Con-
ference on Air Law held at The Hague from 1 to 16 December 1970
(hereinafter referred to as The Hague Conference). After 31 Decem-
ber 1970, the Convention shall be open to all States for signature in
Moscow, London and Washington. Any State which does not sign
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this Convention before its entry into force in accordance with para-
graph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.
2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by the signatory
States. Instruments of ratification and inst-unents of accession shall
be deposited with the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the
Depositary Governments.
3. This Convention shall enter into force thirty days following
the date of the deposit of instruments of ratification by ten States
signatory to this Convention which participated in The Hague Con-
ference.
4. For other States, this Convention shall enter into force on
the date of entry into force of this Convention in accordance with
paragraph 3 of this Article, or thirty days following the date of
deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession, whichever is
later.
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signa-
tory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of
deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession, the date of
entry into force of this Convention and other notices.
6. As soon as this Convention comes into force, it shall be reg-
istered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the
Charter of the United Nations and pursuant to Article 83 of the Con-
vention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago, 1944).
Article 14
1. Any Contracting State may denounce this Convention by writ-
ten notification to the Depositary Governments.
2. Denunciation shall take effect six months following the date on
which notification is received by the Depositary Governments.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, being
duly authorized thereto by their Governments, have signed this
Convention.
DONE at The Hague, this Sixteenth day of December, One Thousand
Nine Hundred and Seventy, in three originals, each being drawn
up in four authentic texts in the English, French, Russian and
Spanish languages.
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Appendix B
A CONVENTION REGARDING THE SAFETY AND SECURITY
OF INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT SERVICES
73
THE PARTIES TO THIS CONVENTION
RECALLING that the Contracting States to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation (the Chicago Convention) have
obligated themselves to ensure the safe and orderly growth of
international civil aviation throughout the world;
NOTING the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts
Committed on Board Aircraft (the Tokyo Convention), the Con-
vention on the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (the Unlawful
Seizure Convention) and the Convention on the Unlawful Inter-
ference with Aircraft (the Unlawful Interference Convention);
FINDING that a heightened threat to the safety and security
of all international civil air transport exists as a result of acts of
unlawful seizure of air craft involving the detention of passengers,
crew and aircraft, contrary to the principles of Article 11 of the
Tokyo Convention, for international blackmail purposes, and the
destruction of such aircraft;
FINDING further that the failure of any State to take into
custody and thereafter to extradite or prosecute, contrary to the
principles of the Unlawful Seizure Convention or the Unlawful
Interference Convention, any person who commits an act of
unlawful seizure for international blackmail purposes or any
person who commits an act of unlawful interference with an air-
craft which results in damage to the aircraft, or death or physical
injury to passengers or crew, encourages similar unlawful acts
and endangers the safety and security of all international civil air
transport; and
CONCLUDING that the threat of unlawful acts of seizure and
interference with civil aviation is worldwide and that consultations
among States and joint action by States is required to prevent
such acts and secure the safety and security of passengers, crew
and aircraft;
73 Id.
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HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
Article 1
Definitions
For purposes of this Convention:
(a) the term "interested State" shall mean-
(i) in the event of an unlawful seizure of a civil aircraft,
the State of registration of the aircraft and any State
whose nationals are on board such aircraft; and
(ii) in the event of an unlawful interference with a civil
aircraft, the State of registration of such aircraft, the
State within the jurisdiction of which such unlawful
interference took place, and any State whose nationals
are on board such aircraft; and
(b) the term "air service State" shall mean any State operating
scheduled or (significant non-scheduled) international civil
air service to or from a State alleged or determined to be in
default under Article 2 or 3 of this Convention, whether or not
such State is a party to this Convention.
Article 2
Determination of Detention
A. Whenever an interested State has reason to believe that an unlaw-
ful seizure of a civil aircraft has occurred and that such aircraft,
its passengers or crew are being detained, contrary to the principles
of Article 11 of the Tokyo Convention, within the territory of
another State for international blackmail purposes, it may-
(1) notify such other State of the reasons for its belief and that
it will request consultations for the purpose of obtaining
a determination of its allegations in this regard unless all
passengers and crew have been permitted to continue on
their journey and the aircraft returned to the person law-
fully entitled to its possession within twenty-four hours; and
(2) notify all States which it believes are interested States or
air service States of its notification given pursuant to sub-
paragraph (1) of this Article and that it requests con-
sultations pursuant to this Convention for the purpose of
obtaining a determination of its allegations.
B. Consultation shall be held at (place) and shall begin not earlier
than twenty-four hours and not later than seventy-two hours fol-
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lowing the notice given pursuant to subparagraph A(2) of this
Article.
C. All interested States and air service States shall be entitled to par-
ticipate and vote in consultations requested pursuant to this Article
2. A finding that all passengers and crew have not been pernitted
to continue on their journey or that the aircraft has not been re-
turned to the person lawfully entitled to its possession shall be
made by majority vote of the States voting. Unless two-third
majority of the States voting decide otherwise, such a finding shall
be considered to establish unlawful detention for international
blackmail purposes contrary to the provisions of Article 11 of the
Tokyo Convention (i.e., a determination of default).
Article 8
Determination Relating to Custody,
Extradition or Prosecution
A. Whenever an interested State has reason to believe that a person
who has committed either (a) an unlawful seizure of a civil
aircraft for international blackmail purposes or (b) an unlawful
interference with a civil aircraft that resulted in damage to the
aircraft or death or physical injury to a passenger or member of
the crew is within the territory of another State, and that such
other State has failed (i) to take such person into immediate
custody in accordance with the principles of the unlawful seizure
convention or the unlawful interference convention or (ii) there-
after to extradite or prosecute such person in accordance with the
principles of such conventions, it may-
(1) notify such other State that it is requesting a determination,
pursuant to this Convention, of its allegations in this regard;
(2) in accordance with the attached Annex to this Convention,
request the President of the International Court of Justice to
establish a five-member inquiry commission to reach find-
ings and conclusions with respect to the allegation; and
(3) notify all States which it believes are interested States or
air service States of its request for the establishment of an
inquiry commission.
B. The findings and conclusions of the inquiry commission shall be
final for purposes of Article 4 of this Convention.
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Article 4
Decisions on Joint Action
A. In the event of a determination of default pursuant to Article 2,
States participating in consultations shall decide as soon as possible
thereafter in accordance with this Article what joint action, if any,
should be taken in furtherance of the safety and security of inter-
national air service.
B. In the event the findings and conclusions of the inquiry commission
determine a default of a State pursuant to Article 3, then any
interested State or air service State may give notice to other such
States that it requests consultations to decide what joint action, if
any, should be taken. Consultations shall begin at (place) within
ten days after such notice is given. All interested States and air
service States shall be entitled to participate in such consultations.
C. Joint action taken pursuant to this Article may include:
(1) the suspension by all air service States of authority for any
carrier to operate international civil air service directly or
indirectly to and from the State determined to be in default;
and
(2) such other measures to be taken by interested States or air
service States that are intended to assure the safety and
security of international civil air service to and from the
State determined to be in default.
D. Each air service State shall be entitled to participate in and vote
on decisions whether to take joint action referred to in subpara-
graph C(1) of this Article, and each air service State and each
interested State shall be entitled to participate in and vote on de-
cisions referred to in subparagraph C (2) of this Article.
E. No air service State shall be required to participate in joint action
referred to in subparagraph C (1) of this Article unless a majority
of air service States present and voting agree that a particular
joint action referred to therein is appropriate; and no interested
State or air service State shall be required to participate in joint
action referred to in subparagraph C(2) of this Article unles a
majority of such States present and voting agree that a particular
joint action referred to therein is appropriate.
F. A decision to take joint action made pursuant to subparagraph
C(1) of this Article 4 shall be binding on all air service States, and
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a decision to take joint action made pursuant to subparagraph
C(2) of this Article shall be binding on all air service States and
interested States whether or not such a State actually participated
in or voted in favour of the joint action, except that such a decision
shall be recommendatory with respect to any interested State or air
service State that is not a party to this Convention.
Article 5
Modification, Suspension or Termination
A. In the event of a decision to take joint action pursuant to Article 4,
the State found in default may request consultations for the purpose
of modification, suspension or termination of the joint action on
the grounds that such action is no longer appropriate or necessary.
B. The States entitled to participate in consultations shall meet at
(place) as soon as practicable and shall decide whether the joint
action should be modified, suspended or terminated. Participation
and voting during such consultations shall be determined as pro-
vided in Article 4.
Article 6
General Provisions
A. A State which is entitled to participate in consultations at the time
of the original request for consultations under Article 2, may con-
tinue to participate and vote even though the basis for its partici-
pation has ceased to exist (such as the release of its nationals
from detention).
B. Copies of notices, determinations, findings or decisions made pur-
suant to this Convention shall be transmitted to all States parties
to the Chicago Convention.
C. The failure of one or more interested State or air service State
to participate in consultations shall not affect the validity of any
determinations or decisions made pursuant to this Convention.
D. A State alleged to be in default may participate in consultations
and vote in determinations made under Article 2. A State de-
termined to be in default may submit appropriate documentation
and make an oral statement to the States participating in con-
sultations, but shall not be entitled to participate in any delibera-
tion or vote, pursuant to Articles 4 or 5 of this Convention.
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Article 7
Other International Agreements
Suspension of authority for any carrier to operate international civil
air transport services by any air service State pursuant to a decision
calling for joint action under Article 4, or any other joint measures
taken by interested States or air service States in accordance with a
decision made under Article 4, shall be considered consistent with
the object and purpose of the obligations of States parties to the
Chicago Convention and shall not be considered inconsistent with
any bilateral air transport agreement existing between States parties
to the Chicago Convention. Contracting States undertake not to
include any provisions inconsistent with the obligations of this Con-
vention in any bilateral air transport agreement to be concluded by
them.
Article 8
Judicial or Arbitral Review
(To be based on Article 24 of Tokyo Convention)
Article 9
Final Clauses
(To be discussed after agreement other articles)
ANNEX TO DRAFT CONVENTION
A. Each State party to this Convention may nominate an expert to
serve on an inquiry commission. The name of such expert shall
be forwarded to the President of the International Court of Justice.
B. Upon request of an interested State, the President of the Inter-
national Court of Justice shall immediately nominate five experts
from the list nominated by States to serve on the inquiry com-
mission. If the President is prevented from acting or is a national
of the State requesting establishment of the commission or the
State against which allegations are brought, the Vice President
shall make the nominations. If the latter is prevented from acting or
is a national of one of such States, the nominations shall be made
by the oldest member of the Court who is not a national of such
State. If practicable, one member of the inquiry commission shall
be a national of the State alleged to be in default, a second member
shall be a national of an interested State or an air service State,
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and three members one of whom shall serve as Chairman, shall be
nationals of States not entitled to participate in the consultations
under this Convention.
C. The inquiry commission shall set its own rules of procedure. Its
findings of facts and conclusions shall be made within thirty days
of its establishment, or as soon thereafter as is practicable.
D. The expenses of the inquiry commission shall be borne equally by
States participating in concultations pursuant to Article 4.
